Abstract-The increasing popularity of graph data, such as social and online communities, has initiated a prolific research area in knowledge discovery and data mining. As more realworld graphs are released publicly, there is growing concern about privacy breaching for the entities involved. An adversary may reveal identities of individuals in a published graph by having the topological structure and/or basic graph properties as background knowledge. Many previous studies addressing such attack as identity disclosure, however, concentrate on preserving privacy in simple graph data only. In this paper, we consider the identity disclosure problem in weighted graphs. The motivation is that, a weighted graph can introduce much more unique information than its simple version, which makes the disclosure easier. We first formalize a general anonymization model to deal with weight-based attacks. Then two concrete attacks are discussed based on weight properties of a graph, including the sum and the set of adjacent weights for each vertex. We also propose a complete solution for the weight anonymization problem to prevent a graph from both attacks. Our approaches are efficient and practical, and have been validated by extensive experiments on both synthetic and real-world datasets.
I. INTRODUCTION
Many natural and man-made systems are structured in the form of graphs. Typical examples include communication networks, biological systems, social networks and transportation infrastructures, etc. The increasing popularity of these graph data has initiated a fertile research area in information extraction and data mining, which benefits various application fields such as sociology, marketing, biomedicine and counterterrorism. However, as more real world graph data has been made publicly available, the privacy preservation, which already has a rich body of research on transactional data [1] , [7] , [13] , [22] , becomes an important concern associated with graph analysis. In this paper, we focus on protecting sensitive identities of individuals in a graph from background knowledge attacks. That is, if certain local knowledge can uniquely identify some vertices in a graph and is known by an adversary, the privacy of these entities can be breached even the data has been perturbed before publication.
Some recent studies [12] , [2] show that, the simple technique of anonymizing graphs by removing the identities/labels of vertices before publishing the actual graph does not always guarantee privacy. For example, the work in [25] identifies neighborhood attacks that an adversary has knowledge about neighbors of a target vertex and the relationship among the neighbors. Another study [14] discusses a specific knowledge Figure 1 . Examples of degree anonymized weighted graph attack assuming an adversary has prior knowledge of the degree of a target vertex. They argue that, if the degree of a vertex is unique in the degree sequence of all vertices, this entity can be easily re-identified even without its original label.
A common character of the studies mentioned above is that, they all concentrate on simple graphs (i.e., undirected, unweighted and loopless graphs) and steer clear of weighted networks, which are often perceived as being harder to analyze than their unweighted counterparts. However, as has long been appreciated, many networks are intrinsically weighted, their edges having differing strengths. In a social network there may be stronger or weaker social ties between individuals. In a transportation network there may be longer or shorter distances between stations. In a communication network there may be more or less bandwidth or data flow between routers/clients. In a metabolic network there may be more or less flux along particular reaction pathways. In a food web there may be more or less energy or carbon flow between predator-prey pairs.
In this paper, we discuss weighted-related properties which may lead to potential background knowledge attacks in a graph. Two important properties are introduced here: 1) volume, which is sum of weights for a node; and 2) histogram, which represents the neighborhood weight distribution of a node. From both theoretical and practical views, a weighted graph provides more unique structure information than a simple graph which increases the risk of identity disclosure. For example, a real-world graph, called NetSci, which has 1, 589 nodes and will be introduced in the experimental section, consists of 1% nodes with unique degree values but more than 6% with unique volume values. We will show the details in the experimental part. Furthermore, many preserving algorithms for simple graphs may not be extended or adapted to their weighted version. For instance, Figure 1 states two weighted graphs, which are 3-degree anonymous and 4-degree anonymous respectively according to the definition in [14] . However the weight values provide some extra unique infor-mation for a vertex, e.g., the volume of the vertex is unique in Figure 1(a) . In the real world, such information may be known as background knowledge and used by adversaries for re-identification.
A. Our Contributions
• We discuss the identity disclosure problems in weighted graphs with certain weight properties as background knowledge. Two weight characteristics are considered: 1) volume: the sum of weights for a vertex; and 2) histogram: the neighborhood weight distribution of a vertex, and we show empirically how high the disclosure risk is with these weight attacks to breach real-world graphs.
• We formalize a general model for weighted graph anonymization, which is to modify edges and weights in a graph to prevent from weight-related attacking.
• We provide a complete solution for the weight anonymization problem introduced in this paper, and show theoretically and empirically how the proposed methods perform on both data privacy and utility.
• We consider the change of graph spectrum as information loss incurred in graph perturbation, and use the algebraic connectivity as an quantitative metric. We also theoretically justify the impact of weight modification on the graph spectrum. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief overview of the literature on the graph anonymization problem. In Section 3, we formally define a general model for weighted graph anonymization and provide two concrete cases of weight-related attacks. We also discuss the use of graph spectrum as the information loss during anonymization in this part. Section 4 focuses on methods against both weight attacks. We present the experimental results in Section 5 and conclude this paper in Section 6.
II. RELATED WORK
Hay et. al. [12] point out the risk that simply removing the identifiers (or label) of the nodes does not always guarantee privacy. They study a spectrum of adversary external information and its power to re-identify individuals in a social network. In details, two types of adversary knowledge are formalized: 1) vertex refinement queries, which reveal the structure of a graph around a vertex. For a node , such information includes its label, degree, the list of its neighbors' degree, and so on. 2) subgraph knowledge queries, which investigate the uniqueness of a subgraph around the target node. The work in [25] and [14] extend the above study by identifying two essential type of privacy attacks, called neighborhood attack and degree attack, respectively. Both of them provide proper models for the proposed anonymity problems and show the efficiencies of algorithms to protect a graph from the corresponding attacks.
The work in [2] describes a family of attacks on a social network whose labels for vertices are replaced with meaningless unique identifiers. The basic idea behind these attacks is to create or find unique subgraphs embedded in an arbitrary network. Then, adversaries can learn whether edges exist or not between specific targeted pairs of nodes.
Zheleva and Getoor [24] consider the problem of protecting sensitive relationships among the individuals in the anonymized social networks. This is closely related to the linkprediction problem that has been widely studied in the link mining community. The work in [23] studies how anonymization algorithms that are based on randomly adding and removing edges change certain graph properties. More specifically, they focus on the change caused in the spectrum of the network.
Liu et. al. [15] take weights as consideration for privacy preserving in social networks. They study situations, such as in a business transaction network, in which weights are attached to network edges that are considered to be confidential. Then, they provide two perturbation strategies for this application. In particular, their methods yields an approximate length of the shortest path while maintaining the shortest path between selected pairs of nodes, but also maximizes privacy preservation of the original weights. The research in [21] extend the above work by formulating an abstract model based on linear programming. However, the objective of their work still focuses on maintaining certain linear property of a social network by reassigning edge weights.
III. PROBLEM DEFINITION
In this section, we first provide some preliminaries and notations used throughout the paper. Then a general model is proposed to define the weight anonymization problem (WA) for a graph. Furthermore, we consider an efficient metric to quantify the information loss incurred by the graph perturbation and its relations with other measures in previous studies. Finally, we discuss two concrete weight-related attacks.
A. Preliminaries and Notations
An undirected and weighted graph ( , , ) is specified by its vertex set , edge set , and weight set . The cardinalities are | | = and | | = respectively. In most studies of graph theory, each entry in is represented as a numeric label ( ) associated with each edge ∈ . Deviating from this convention, this paper considers a vertexrelated definition as an alternative.
Definition 1: (weight bag) For each vertex ∈ , we define a weight bag for as the sequence of weights on all edges connecting with other vertices, denoted by
, where represents the degree of . A weight bag can be a multiset since different edges can have the same weight in real world cases. Then the weight set can be described as the complete set of weight bags in , i.e., = {w 1 , . . . , w }, where is the number of vertices. For example, the weight bag for the vertex in Figure 1 In this paper, we allow weights to be integers, rational numbers or real numbers but non-negative. Given a graph ′ ( , ′ , ′ ) perturbed from , the above constraint requires there are no negative entries in the perturbed weight set ′ .
B. Weight Anonymity: A General Model
In general, a large variety of weight properties deriving from the weight set can be used to identify a vertex. Let be a function mapping → , i.e., = (w) w ∈ . Notice that is unnecessary to be a linear function. Here, we say is the weight property corresponding to the function . Assume that ∈ is the weight property for the vertex . Then, if has the unique value in and has been know by an adversary, can be successfully identified from the graph. Hence, we first introduce the following term about -weight anonymous graph.
Definition 2: ( -weight anonymity) A graph is -weight anonymous if for every vertex , there exist at least −1 other vertices in the graph with the same weight property ∈ as . Let denote the information loss incurred in the entire perturbation process. For a weight property , we formally propose the weighted graph anonymization (WGA) problem as follows.
Problem 1: (weighted graph anonymization) Given a weighted graph ( , , ), and an integer , find a -weight anonymous graph ′ ( , ′ , ′ ) according to the weight property , such that is minimized. The information loss is a critical measure to quantify the utility of a perturbed graph, and we will introduce an efficient metric in the next section. To solve graph perturbation problems, most of the previous work [15] , [14] , [21] uses a twostep strategy which splits the problem into two sub-problems, called property anonymization and graph reconstruction. The idea behind is to reform the structure of a graph according to either its randomized weight matrix or anonymized property sequence. For each step, the methods are devoted to minimizing the information loss incurred by perturbation or reconstruction. Such a strategy is quite attractive for large graph anonymity due to its reasonable complexity in real applications. Therefore, all methods proposed in this paper will follow this track.
C. Metrics for Information Loss
The information loss, or sometimes called data utility, has a wide concept and various metrics have been proposed in privacy preserving data analysis. The task to determine an efficient measure becomes even more complex in graph analysis due to its topological structure. Instead of real graph properties, such as clustering coefficient or average path length, the work [14] quantifies information loss by using the number of edges changed before and after graph perturbation. We first consider extending this metric to the WGA problem, if we plan to perturb a graph against weight attacks. Then, given a sequence of certain weight property w = [w 1 , . . . , w ], the information loss incurred by property anonymization is mathematically formalized as follows,
where is the number of anonymous groups, and w * represent the number of objects and the anonymous object in each group. Although it is quite simple and intuitive to use as information loss incurred in the perturbation, the underlying relationship between such anonymization cost and the topological structure of a graph is still unclear. In this paper, we consider a metric of information loss based on spectral graph theory.
Recall that, the Laplacian matrix of a weighted graph ( , ) is defined as = − , where and are the degree matrix and the adjacency matrix respectively. The set of eigenvalues of , = ( 1 , 2 , . . . , ), is called the spectrum of . If the graph only contains one component,
. Many studies [16] , [9] , [6] point out that the spectrum plays a central role in understanding of graphs, since it is closely related to most invariants of a graph, such as mean distance, diameter, connectivity, expanding properties, maximum cut, isoperimetric number and randomness of the graph. Particularly, the second smallest eigenvalue 2 , known as algebraic connectivity, has been discovered its application to several difficult problems in graph theory. In this paper, we use the bias of 2 to measure the information loss. Let . Then, the information loss is defined as
Therefore, an anonymizing algorithm aims to find a perturbation to minimize Equation 2, while guarantee the privacy of entities in the graph. Now, we discuss the relation between in Equation 1 and 2 . The following theorem describes impacts of the weight modification on the spectrum. The proof of Theorem 1 is omitted here due to the space limitation. Theorem 1 shows the change of weights can approximately estimate the bias of 2 , which leads to an efficient way to develop anonymization algorithms. It is ideal to quantify the relation between 2 and the modification of weights with a determined function 2 = ( ). However, exploring such a function is still an open problem in the matrix perturbation theory. In this paper, we allow single operation only, i.e., either increasing weight or decreasing weight. With such assumption, the optimal anonymization problem can be reduced the problem of minimizing the weight changes in the anonymization progress. Equation 1 only provides an efficient measure to achieve the minimal information loss in designing an anonymization algorithm. However, the bias of the spectrum can be influenced by reconstructing a graph as well. The work in [11] provides theoretical analysis of reconstructing a weighted graph from its spectrum, which maintains the eigenvalues perfectly. However, the conditions for reconstructability of weighted graphs are only sufficient and it can be costly to implement. Therefore, we provide efficient methods for graph construction with the objective of minimizing the information loss in later section.
D. Weight-related Attack: Two Cases
There exist a variety of weight properties in a weighted graph. Based on the general model for weight anonymity, we will discuss two types of weight-related attacks and apply the general model on these anonymization problems.
Volume attack. We first consider a weight property, called volume, which describes the sum of a weight bag. That is, the function = ∑ , and for a vertex , = ∑
=1
. Notice that, the value of volume is sometimes used as degree in research of weighted graphs, but we use it separately for clear statement. Using to specifically represent the volume of , we can form a sequence
where is the number of vertices. It is easy to find that, if there exists a unique in and the value is known by an adversary, the entity represented by will be identified from the published graph. We call this privacy breaching process as volume attack. Correspondingly, we can define -volume anonymous for a graph as follows. ) to represent the set of bin frequencies for , where is the number of elements in the corresponding bin and is the number of bins. Here, we assume the partitionings of histogram bins are the same for all vertices. Then, we can define -histogram anonymous for a graph as follows.
Definition 4: ( -histogram anonymity) A graph ishistogram anonymous if for every node , there exist at least − 1 other nodes in the graph with the same histogram as . A special case of histogram attacks is that weights are all integers and the bin width in every histogram is 1. Then, the similarity of histograms can be transfer to the similarity of weight bags. We say two weight bags are equal if and only if they have the same elements and the same multiplicity for each elements. The graph (a) in Figure 1 = { [3, 3] , [3, 3] , [3, 2] , [3, 2] }. Discussion. It is worth to discuss the relationships among various weight anonymity problems, since it may provide alternatives to design anonymization algorithms. The degree anonymity is also considered as a special case of weight anonymity. We have the following proposition.
Proposition 1:
If a graph is -histogram anonymous, then it is also 1 -degree anonymous and 2 -volume anonymous, where 1 , 2 ≥ .
The proof is obvious with the equality property of weight bags. This proposition shows that an approach for histogram anonymity achieves degree and volume anonymity at the same or a higher security level. We have to point out that the proposition 1 is just a sufficient condition. That is, degree and volume anonymity cannot guarantee the same level of histogram anonymity.
IV. HISTOGRAM ANONYMIZATION
In this section, we consider methods to protect a graph from histogram attack. Based on our general model and the definition of -histogram anonymity, the histogram anonymization (HA) problem is formally defined as follows.
Problem 2: (histogram anonymization) Given a weighted graph ( , , ), and an integer , construct a -histogram anonymous graph ′ ( , ′ , ′ ), such that the information loss is minimized. The solution to Problem 2 follows the two-step strategy discussed in previous section. It first tries to find the optimal anonymity ′ for with the minimal cost , and then construct a weighted graph with ′ and the original vertex set . Now we introduce algorithms for these steps respectively in the following two parts.
A. The k-histogram Anonymization
The first challenge in histogram anonymization is to perform proper data preparation for the calculation of information loss, since weight bags in a weight set may come in different size. Considering each weight bag as a point in a unified multidimensional space, the preparation procedure is required to maintain these points as dense as possible. Mathematically, for a vertex , its weight bag w = [ 1 , . . . , ] can be seen as a vector in the -dimension space, where is the degree of . If let = ( ) ∈ [1, ], we can map all weight bags in to the -dimension space, denoted as × , in which each weight bag is represented by a column vector with length . This mapping procedure will expand weight bags with < by filling ( − ) zeros. Lemma 1: Given a graph with a weight set , the -weight anonymization with the lowest cost can be achieved if every column vector in the set is sorted in descending order.
Proof: Recall that a weight bag is defined as a sorted multiset. Let can be justified by iteration process. Lemma 1 is a necessary condition for an anonymization algorithm to achieve the lowest cost. It implies that, to guarantee the lowest information loss, we have to assign 0 to the end of weight bags whose sizes are smaller than . For instance, in Another issue in the HA problem is to determine the anonymous object for data generalization in each anonymous group. Generally, these objects are expected to be chosen from the original dataset. However, this constraint is too strict for histogram anonymization, as the unique weight operation is allowed only so far. Here, we relax the constraint to allow the method building the 'largest' vector as the anonymous object. That is, for a group = (u 1 , . . . , u ), we generate a vector u * as its anonymous object, where * = ( ). For example, given = [3, 2, 1; 3, 2, 1; 2, 2, 1; 3, 3, 0] , a vector u * = [3, 3, 1] is formed as the anonymous object for .
The complexity of this problem has not been assessed so far as we know. However, the work in [19] discusses a similar problem with the u * being the mean vector of a group, which has been proved NP-hard. Although it is unclear that whether the HA problem can be inducted from this existing problem, we can prove its NP-hardness by using the similar induction process, which is omitted here due to space limitation. Therefore, we describe an efficient heuristic algorithm as a solution in Algorithm 1.
The computational complexity of Algorithm 1 is ( 2 ). Here, we form a symmetric × distance matrix that each entry represents the Euclidean distance between two weight bags in . It reduces the complexity of the initialization step to linear. In each step of recursion, the algorithm introduce (
2 ) operations to calculate all new distances among groups. Finally, there are recursions due to the group merging. Therefore, the total complexity is ( 2 ).
B. Graph Construction With An Anonymized Weight Set
Graph construction is the second stage of the two-step strategy, which aims to construct a graph with an anonymized weight set. The graph construction based on a specified degree or volume sequence has been extensively studied in previous work [8] , [10] , [4] . Although the -histogram anonymity guarantees the -volume anonymity, the realizability of volume sequences is not sufficient for that of weight sets. Therefore, by given a weight set , we provide a Weighted Graph Construction (WGC) method based on edge removal in Algorithm 2.
The WGC algorithm takes the specified weight set as inputs and returns either a successfully constructed graph or "Fail" meaning is not realizable.
Step 2 is a basic condition to ensure the total degree of the graph is even. For a vertex, Steps from 6 to 9 describe an efficient procedure to remove edges by matching each element in its weight bag. Specifically, for a picked vertex , when chooses a candidate to join, the procedure has to ensure w contains an element which appears in w as well, i.e., = . The lay-off procedure for sequence realizability only guarantees the sum of weights and the combination of edge connections can be various. The constraint introduced by histogram anonymity can be too strict to satisfy. This may break the weight anonymity but significantly rise the success rate of constructing a graph. In addition, since the weight will be increased anyway, it is still impossible for an adversary to identify an entity. In practice, we can relax the condition = as | − | < , where is a specified threshold. As we show in our experimental evaluation, the constructing algorithms can successfully generate anonymized graphs in most cases with a small value of .
Step 11 is to ensure the connectivity of the output graph. That is, if the construction results a graph with several components, it will bridge them by swapping certain edges. For example, assuming that ( , ) ∈ ( , ) and ( , ) as ( , ) and ( , ) . If the algorithm terminates and outputs a graph, then this graph has the specified weight set .
The computational complexity of Algorithm 2 is ( 2 2 ), where is the number of vertices and is the maximal degree for all vertices. For each vertex , there are maximal edges connecting with other nodes. And for each edge, the worst case is traversing all remaining vertices to find , which is × times. As there are vertices, the total complexity is ( 2 2 ). Notice that, Step 7 makes a trade-off between efficiency and accuracy in Algorithm 2, as there may exist a group of and it can result various information loss by connecting with different . To optimize the information loss incurred in graph construction, we provide a sort-then-switch procedure on the edge set of a constructed graph (the implementation of this procedure is omitted here). The procedure takes a constructed graph and the eigenvalue 2 computed from the original graph. The main idea is to determine the range of switching candidates by sorting the edge set first, and then switch edges Algorithm 2 The Weighted Graph Construction Algorithm Input: A weight set . Output: A graph ( , , ) or "Fail" if the graph cannot be constructed.
return "Fail"; 4: while consists of non-zero elements do 5:
pick a random vertex with w ∕ = 0 and ′ ← ;
6:
join ( , ) as an edge with ( , ); 9:
amend the connectivity of
return ( , , ).
to find the connections leading to the closest eigenvalue to 2 . The complexity of this procedure is ( 3 2 ) in the worst case, where and is the size of and respectively, while the major cost is to calculate the eigenvalue in each iteration with the standard eigen-decomposition taking (
3 ) operations. However, it can be significantly improved by using eigenspace approximation techniques, such as the Lanczos algorithm and its variation [5] . Moreover, let be the size of the switching set with maximal candidates. Our experiments show that the value is much less than in general, which means the inner iteration in Step 5 only has a small number for real graphs. Therefore, Algorithm 2 is also efficient to work on large scale graph data with the sort-then-switch procedure.
V. EXPERIMENTS
In this section we evaluate the performance of the proposed graph anonymization algorithms. The experiments are conducted on a 2.16 GHz Intel Core 2 Duo Mac with 4GB of 667MHz DDR2 SDRAM running the Macintosh OS X 10.5.8 operating system. All algorithms are implemented using Matlab 7.0.
A. Datasets
We use both synthetic and real-world datasets. For experiments with synthetic data, we generate a random weighted graph with nodes randomly connected to each other with a specified probability . Here, we set = 2, 000 and = 0.5. For each edge, the model assigns a random integer weight in the range [1, 100] .
We also use two real-world graph datasets, named as BkFrat and NetSci respectively. All these graphs are weighted and undirected. The BkFrat graph [3] concerns interactions among students living in a fraternity at a West Virginia college. The graph contains 58 nodes with all integer weights in the range of [0, 51]. The NetSci graph [18] contains a coauthorship network of scientists working on network theory and experiment. The version given here consists of 1, 589 scientists and assigns real weights as described in [17] .
All the real-world graph datasets are available at http://www-personal.umich.edu/~mejn/netdata/. All the testing data has been simply generalized by removing all real labels for their vertices.
B. Weight Attacks on Real-world Data
Our first experiment is to show how possible weight attacks may happen on real-world graphs. We consider both volume attack and histogram attack, and also provide results of degree attack as a comparison. Table I shows our results. The parameter is a threshold to assess a breach. That is, while the number of vertices sharing the same value of a weight property is no larger than , these vertices are considered to be disclosed. It clearly shows that weight attacks are a real issue for graph data publishing. All testing datasets have relatively high risk of entity disclosure. For BkFrat data, the success rate of volume attack with = 1 is high as 93%, and even higher as 98% for histogram attack, which implies that most of its vertices can be uniquely identified. Also, the disclosure risk grows quite fast as increases. For example, the success rate of volume attack on the NetSci dataset increases nearly 10% with = 10 than that with = 1.
Moreover, the results show that weight attacks have much higher success rate to breach a dataset than degree attack, which means such attacks are more practical in real-world scenarios. Also, both weight attacks maintain similar success rates while the impact of degree attack is decreased significantly, as the data size increase. The result for NetSci data shows there are 11.01% vertices with high disclosure risk as = 10 for volume attack, which means around 180 entities have the possibility to be identified. However, such number is only 46 for degree attack.
C. Information Loss By Weight Anonymization
In this section, we assess the qualitative performance of information loss incurred by applying histogram anonymization. As a comparison, we also implement a greedy anonymization algorithm for volume attack, called GreedyVA, which is modified from degree anonymization [14] by replacing the degree sequence with volume sequence.
The graphs in Figure 2 describe the relations between anonymization cost and various for the RandGraph, BkFrat and NetSci datasets respectively. The results show that the anonymization costs increase slowly while is not large (e.g., < 20 in RandGraph or < 50 in NetSci) for both anonymization algorithms. Also, we note that the HA results bigger cost as expecting than the GreedyVA in all cases. But the relative differences are much smaller in real-world data than that in synthetic graph.
D. Information Loss By Graph Construction 1) Impacts on Graph Spectrum:
We evaluate and compare the information loss for the complete histogram anonymization. Figure 3 summarizes the impacts on the spectrum 2 on Y-axis with varying for the testing datasets. Two construction methods are compared here: WGC (HA-WGC) and WGC with the sort-then-switch procedure (HA-WGCS). From the plots we can observe that, the sort-then-switch procedure can significantly improve the utility performance of histogram anonymization. For example, in RandGraph, such a procedure reduces the bias of information loss from 1.4 to 0.6 for = 250. The gap is not significant for NetSci compared to other data, and it is not obvious to decide the major reason.
2) Impacts on Real Graph Characteristics: As mentioned above, the spectrum of a graph has close relations with many real graph characteristics. In this section, we conduct evaluation of the information loss based on real graph characteristics of the test data with the algorithms of HA-WGC and HA-WGCS. We focus on two most robust metrics of network topology. The first one is the global clustering coefficient which is a measure of degree to which nodes in a graph tend to cluster together. A generalized clustering coefficient is formally defined in [20] 
where △ is the total value of triangles and 3 is the total value of triplets. In addition, we define the value of a triplet as the geometric mean of the weights of ties. The second one is the weighted average path length, , which is defined as the average cost of steps along the shortest paths for all possible pairs of network nodes. Figures 4 and 5 show the relative changes of the real graph properties and with HA-WGC and HA-WGCS approaches by varying . In each figure, a constant line appears to the property value of the original graph, which is unaffected by the value of . As expected, the anonymization process decreases both graph properties since new edges and weights are increased. The results shows that HA-WGCS maintains both real graph properties much better than HA-WGC, which corresponds to the impact on the spectrum. Also, it is easy to observe that HA-WGCS can lead to very small bias of property values from their original values in both cases.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we discussed a class of important background knowledge attacks in weighted graph. We provided a general model for the weight anonymization problem to against weight-related attacks. As a proof of concept, we considered the -volume anonymity and the -histogram anonymity as two cases which could occur in the real-world privacy graph data publication. We provide a complete solution to achieve both volume anonymity and histogram anonymity by using the graph spectrum as an effective metric for information loss. We also analyzed the complexity of the models, and experimentally validate our analysis using both synthetic and real-world weighted graphs.
There are many issues of this work need to to be addressed clearer merit further research. As a NP-hard problem, it is worth to develop approximation algorithms for the histogram anonymization problem. Also, if we allow random weight modification (increment and decrement), the impact on graph spectrum has to be re-considered. In addition, this paper only evaluate clustering coefficient and average path length as realgraph properties, and the affect on other topological structure is still unclear. 
